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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 03-1594

JOSEPH FORD,
Appellant
v.
*JOANNE B. BARNHART,
COMM ISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
*Pursuant to Rule 43(c), F.R.A.P.

On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-00456)
District Judge: Honorable Kent Jordan

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 17, 2003

BEFORE: SLOVITER, ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed October 28, 2003)

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Joseph Ford appeals the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware, affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) to deny Ford’s claim for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Titles II and
XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1383f
(2002). The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history. Hence, we limit
ourselves to a brief statement of the reason for our decision.
Appellant argues that the decision of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
finding that Appellant’s drug addiction and alcoholism were contributing factors material
to a finding of disability was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ
failed to properly evaluate Appellant’s mental impairments. Furthermore, Appellant
argues that the ALJ erred in accepting the testimony of a vocational expert that absent
drug addiction and alcoholism Appellant would be able to perform a limited range of light
work and, therefore, was not disabled within the meaning of the Act, arguing that the
testimony of the expert was based upon a defective hypothetical question asked by the
ALJ. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the District Court that the
ALJ both properly evaluated the evidence of Appellant’s mental impairments and based
his decision that absent drug addiction and alcoholism Appellant would be able to
perform a limited range of light work on substantial evidence.
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I.
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear this review of the
Commissioner’s final determination under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2002) and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2002). Our review of the Commissioner’s final
decision to deny benefits is limited to a determination of whether that decision is
supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d
Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence ‘does not mean a large or considerable amount of
evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108
S.Ct. 2541, 2545, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988)).
II.
“Disability” is defined in the Act as an inability “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Under the Act, a claimant is considered unable to engage
in any substantial gainful activity “only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy....” 42 U.S.C. §§
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423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The Commissioner makes this determination based upon a
regulation promulgated by the Social Security Administration that sets out a five-step
sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920. This Court has
described the five-step sequential evaluation process as follows:
In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is
currently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).
If a claimant is found to be engaged in substantial activity, the disability
claim will be denied. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140, 107 S.Ct. 2287,
2290-91, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). In step two, the Commissioner must
determine whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant fails to show that her impairments are
“severe”, she is ineligible for disability benefits.
In step three, the Commissioner compares the medical evidence of the
claimant's impairment to a list of impairments presumed severe enough to
preclude any gainful work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If a claimant does not
suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the analysis proceeds to
steps four and five. Step four requires the ALJ to consider whether the
claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The claimant bears the burden of
demonstrating an inability to return to her past relevant work. Adorno v.
Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir.1994).
If the claimant is unable to resume her former occupation, the evaluation
moves to the final step. At this stage, the burden of production shifts to the
Commissioner, who must demonstrate the claimant is capable of
performing other available work in order to deny a claim of disability. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). The ALJ must show there are other jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can
perform, consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past
work experience, and residual functional capacity. The ALJ must analyze
the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining
whether she is capable of performing work and is not disabled.
Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 118-19 (3d Cir. 2000)
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(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir.1999)).
However, in the case of an individual suffering from alcoholism or drug
addiction, the Act additionally requires that “[a]n individual shall not be considered to be
disabled for purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for
this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination
that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C), 1382c(a)(3)(J). Under the
Social Security Administration’s regulations, the “key factor” in determining whether a
claimant’s alcohol or drug abuse is a material contributing factor to the claimant’s
disability is “whether we would still find [the claimant] disabled if [he or she] stopped
using drugs or alcohol.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b)(1), 416.935(b)(1).
The ALJ is to determine which of the claimant’s physical and mental
limitations would remain if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol, and then must
determine whether any of the claimant’s remaining limitations would be disabling. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b)(2), 416.935(b)(2). If the ALJ determines that the remaining
limitations would not be disabling, the ALJ must find that the claimant’s “drug addiction
or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b)(2)(I), 416.935(b)(2)(I). However, if the ALJ determines that the
remaining limitations would be disabling, the ALJ must conclude that the claimant is
“disabled independent of [his or her] drug addiction or alcoholism and ... [his or her] drug
addiction or alcoholism is not a contributing factor material to the determination of
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disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b)(2)(ii), 416.935(b)(2)(ii)
III.
A.
Appellant first argues that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence because the ALJ mischaracterized or misstated the reports of various
medical personnel in reaching his determination, causing the ALJ to improperly evaluate
Appellant’s mental impairments. Appellant takes issue with the ALJ having referred to
an evaluation by Dr. William Shaw as a “psychiatric evaluation” rather than a
“psychological evaluation.” However, the ALJ evaluated the substance of Dr. Shaw’s
report and did not base his decision upon whether he thought that Dr. Shaw was
performing a psychiatric rather than psychological evaluation. Appellant argues that
because the ALJ characterized Dr. Shaw as saying that Ford had an “adjustment disorder
with an anxious mood secondary to his alcohol abuse,” the ALJ incorrectly characterized
Dr. Shaw’s testimony as supporting the conclusion that alcohol abuse was a contributing
factor material to the determination that Appellant is disabled.1 However, regardless of
what specifically the ALJ meant by “secondary to,” the ALJ referenced Dr. Shaw’s report
in the sentence quoted by Ford only for the limited purpose of showing that Ford still
suffered from alcohol abuse at the time of Dr. Shaw’s evaluation.
1

Dr. Shaw’s report read in pertinent part as follows: “In addition the alcohol abuse
needs to be ruled out prior to any real anxiety-reduction program. Reports has to start the
day off with drinking because of his nerves. Reports drinking a fifth of whiskey per
week.”
6

Appellant next objects to the ALJ’s characterization of Dr. Joseph Bryer’s
report, which the ALJ describes as having determined that “the claimant’s primary
impairment was alcohol dependence.” Dr. Bryer’s report did in fact indicate that his
diagnosis of Ford “would be alcohol dependence, although there may well be a separate
psychiatric disorder” and noted that “[t]he current heavy use of alcohol makes diagnosis
of any other psychiatric disorder impossible at this time.” Dr. Bryer did not attempt to
diagnose (and in fact notes that he could not have diagnosed) any separate psychiatric
disorders at that time that would exist regardless of Ford’s alcohol dependence. As with
Dr. Shaw’s report, the ALJ briefly references Dr. Bryer’s report and correctly notes that
the impairment diagnosed by Dr. Bryer was alcohol dependence. The ALJ does not rely
on Dr. Bryer’s report for a determination of what mental impairments Appellant would
suffer from had he not been abusing alcohol.
Appellant additionally takes issue with the ALJ’s use of a report by Dr.
George Reynolds, which the ALJ describes as “conclud[ing] that the claimant had a
generalized anxiety disorder that would respond favorably to proper treatment.” In
Appellant’s opinion, the ALJ should have evaluated whether a “generalized anxiety
disorder” is related to or affected by Appellant’s use of alcohol. Appellant argues that a
“generalized anxiety disorder is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance
(i.e., of drugs or alcohol),” and that therefore, Dr. Reynolds’s diagnosis of a generalized
anxiety disorder “eliminates any consideration of alcohol in determination of the
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diagnosis.” However, Dr. Reynolds’s opinion does not support a finding that Appellant’s
anxiety disorder, absent alcoholism, necessarily would be disabling. Dr. Reynolds
specifically indicated that he thought that Ford could “probably bring the condition under
control” if he received proper treatment. The ALJ properly considered the Reynolds
report in reaching his determination and did not mischaracterize its contents.
Appellant then takes issue with the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Patricia Lifrak’s
evaluation of Appellant. The ALJ described Dr. Lifrak as reporting that “the claimant’s
diagnoses included alcohol dependence, polysubstance abuse, and anxiety secondary to
alcohol withdrawal.” Appellant takes issue with the ALJ not having mentioned that Dr.
Lifrak at one point indicated that it was necessary to “[r]ule out panic disorder with
agoraphobia.” However, this statement was not indicative of a diagnosis of panic
disorder and need not have been considered on this basis as one of Appellant’s
impairments by the ALJ.
Appellant similarly argues that the ALJ simply “did not consider” a
September 1998 opinion completed by Dr. Lifrak that described several of Ford’s mental
impairments. However, as the government has correctly indicated in its brief, the ALJ did
consider Dr. Lifrak’s opinion when he determined that Appellant’s anxiety disorder, as it
existed while Ford was under the influence of alcoholism and drug addiction, would in
fact be disabling. The ALJ correctly did not rely on Dr. Lifrak’s opinion in determining
whether Appellant’s anxiety disorder would still be disabling absent alcoholism and drug
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addiction, as Dr. Lifrak’s opinion was rendered in the context of substance abuse still
being present.
Over a two-year period, Ford was also treated by the Northeast Treatment
Counseling Center (“NET”), which kept various medical records on his treatment. The
ALJ described these records as showing that “the claimant’s primary impairments were
alcohol and cannabis dependence.” Appellant notes that the ALJ did not discuss other
psychiatric diagnoses discussed in these records, including panic disorder with
agoraphobia, dysthymia, and impulse control disorder. The upshot of the ALJ not having
noted these diagnoses contained in the NET records, Appellant argues, is that the ALJ did
not consider them in reaching his determination that Appellant is not disabled but for his
alcoholism.
However, in an attempt to fulfill the Appeals Council’s mandate that the
ALJ determine which of the established mental impairments would remain if Appellant
were to stop abusing alcohol, the ALJ supplied the entire medical record to Dr. Richard
B. Saul. Dr. Saul’s opinion provides sufficient support for the ALJ’s conclusion that in
the absence of alcohol abuse Appellant would not be disabled and is capable of
performing gainful work in the regional or national economy other than his previous
relevant employment. Appellant argues that the ALJ impermissibly rejected Dr. Lifrak’s
opinion in a wholesale fashion supposedly because the ALJ indicated that Dr. Lifrak’s
opinion did not describe Appellant’s limitations absent alcohol and drug use.
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Alternatively, Appellant argues that Dr. Lifrak was ambiguous as to whether she was
considering the impact of alcohol or drug abuse when she prepared her report, and that
therefore the ALJ should have sought clarification from Dr. Lifrak to resolve this alleged
ambiguity. Appellant views the ALJ as having rejected Dr. Lifrak’s opinion and having
relied solely on Dr. Saul’s opinion.
However, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Lifrak’s opinion at all or find it to be
ambiguous. The ALJ found Dr. Lifrak’s various reports to be consistent with Dr. Saul’s
findings, and relied on Dr. Saul for a specific consideration of what limitations would
remain in the absence of alcohol abuse. In so relying on Dr. Saul’s opinion, we cannot
say that the ALJ lacked substantial evidence in reaching the conclusion that “the medical
evidence of record shows that the claimant’s condition does not meet or equal the criteria
of any listed impairment when the claimant’s alcohol abuse is not considered.”
B.
Appellant’s final claim is that the vocational expert’s testimony does not
support the ALJ’s finding of residual functional capacity because the doctor whose
evaluation provided the basis for the ALJ’s hypothetical question did not fill out a Mental
Residual Function Capacity (“MRFC”) assessment form. Appellant refers us to no
authority, however, requiring the use of such a form by a medical expert (or, indeed, by
an ALJ, whose analysis that form is intended to guide). The question posed by the ALJ to
the vocational expert accurately reflected the claimant’s individual physical and mental
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impairments as reflected in the evidence and as found by the ALJ. Appellant has
identified no impairment found by the ALJ that was not included in the hypothetical.
While Dr. Lifrak completed an MRFC, the ALJ found that her opinion did not consider
what limitations claimant would possess absent alcohol abuse. Nothing more was
required.
IV.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

TO THE CLERK:

Please file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion.

/s/ Walter K. Stapleton
Circuit Judge
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